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Abstract
We run a public good experiment in the field and in the lab with (partly) the same
subjects. The field experiment is a true natural field experiment as subjects do not
know that they are exposed to an experimental variation. We can show that subjects’
behavior in the classic lab public good experiment correlates with their behavior in
the structurally comparable public good treatment in the field but not with behavior
in any of two control treatments we ran in the field. This effect is also economically
significant. We conclude that a) the classic lab public good experiment captures
important aspects of structurally equivalent real life situations and b) that behavior
in lab and field at least in our setting is driven by the same underlying forces.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decades a huge number of laboratory experiments have documented a large
variety of behavioral patterns. Recently the discussion whether results obtained in labora-
tory settings can be readily extrapolated to field settings has intensified.1 One particularly
prominent strand of the laboratory literature has dealt with experimentally analyzing a
large variety of public good situations where contributions are socially beneficial but un-
enforceable. We run a public good experiment in the field and in the lab with (partly)
the same subjects to investigate the external validity of laboratory results and whether
behavior in lab and field is driven by similar forces.
As the first part of our study we run a field experiment and hire students to register
books in a university library. It is a natural field experiment according to John List’s
classification (see http : //www.fieldexperiments.com/), as participants do not know that
they participate in an experiment and work in a natural environment. In the end we invite
them back for a lab experiment in which they play a public good game. We then compare
behavior in the lab and in the field (“within subject”). The students register books in
three institutional environments. In our main treatment they have the the opportunity
to free-ride. Though the framing between lab and field is different (effort in, time out vs.
tokens in, tokens out, labor market vs. neutral framing, . . . ), the underlying game theoretic
structure is similar insofar as there are free riding incentives present. We document that
in this treatment, productivity is highly correlated with contributions in the laboratory
public good game. In two control treatments, without scope for free riding, it is not. This
is consistent with a game theoretic model based on heterogeneous but stable (fairness)
preferences.2
Furthermore, if we are willing to impose additional structure, we can quantify effects. In
the field pubic good treatment, choosing a worker who contributes one additional standard
deviation in the lab public good game, results in 14% more performance (measured as
number of books registered per minute). To put this into perspective: For our task, regis-
tering books, ability (being used to use a computer, typing, etc.) is important and varies
widely across subjects. Choosing a worker with a one standard deviation better test score
results in 13% more performance (books per minute). I.e., selecting workers on ability and
1See e.g., the papers by Levitt (2007) or Levitt and List (2007).
2We will use the terminology “fairness preferences” rather loosely in most of the paper as we are
not in the position to discern between different fairness theories like reciprocity (Rabin, 1993), inequity
aversion(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), or (Charness and Rabin, 2002). We
have in mind preferences that result in above selfish equilibrium contributions in public good settings. In
Section 3.2 we will discuss the issue in some more detail.
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fairness, as measured by lab contributions, have an impact in a similar order of magnitude.
This seems to be broadly in line with the priorities of real world employers.3
Finally, we show that incentivizing workers has ambiguous effects depending on group
heterogeneity with regards to ability: Incentives may even backfire in heterogeneous groups.
We conclude that, at least in the case we study, selecting the right workers increases
performance more reliably than incentivizing them.
Related Literature: Many variations of the classic public good experiment, Kim and
Walker (1984) and Isaac et al. (1985), have been conducted to check the stability of the
outcomes. For a survey of early variations, see the survey in the Handbook of Experimen-
tal Economics by Ledyard (1995) or the survey by Fehr and Gaechter (2000). One of
the reasons why public good experiments have received a lot attention in the literature
is that the simple public good game serves as a powerful metaphor for many economic
situations which involve free riding, as classic public goods, intellectual property rights for
informational goods, or team production in organizations.
Very recently, a few papers relate behavior in the lab and in the field. Fehr and Leibbrandt
(2008) combine laboratory and field observations of the same individuals, for example, of
fishermen who face a common pool resource dilemma and Benz and Meier (2008) match
laboratory observations to donations data from the University of Zurich. These papers
also find a positive correlation between field and lab behavior, but they do not have control
and treatment groups in the field. Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008) show that soccer
players play mixing strategies both in penalty shootouts and experimental matching pennies
games4, and Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009) show that chess grand masters play the Nash
equilibrium in centipede games. These papers find similar strategic behavior in lab and
field tasks, but there is selection into the field task (professional athletes and chess players).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the exper-
imental set-up for the field and the lab study. Section 3 presents the results and Section 4
discusses the results and concludes.
3See for example Rosse et al. (1991) or Dunn (1995) for studies on the relative importance of different
characteristics in hiring decisions.
4Though Levitt et al. (2010) are not able to replicate this finding in their study.
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2 Experimental Set Up
2.1 General
As the first part of our study we run a field experiment and hire students to register books
in a university library. It is a natural field experiment as participants do not know that
they participate in an experiment and work in a natural work environment. At the end of
the field experiment we pay the subjects their wage and invite them to come to our lab
and participate in a lab experiment roughly two weeks later. We still do not reveal to the
subjects that they participated in a field experiment. In the lab subjects play a public
good game and answer a questionnaire. In the following we describe the two parts of our
study separately in detail.
2.2 Field Experiment
The field experiment took place between October 1 and October 21 of 2008 at the Eco-
nomics Department of the University of Munich. We recruited 103 subjects to register
books in an institute library. The positions were advertised as one-time half-day jobs via
posters all over the university campus, in student dorms, and on internet job portals. The
job promised to pay a salary of e55 and the job duration was given with “up to 5 hours”.
Applicants had to apply via the recruiting website where they entered demographic infor-
mation, contact details and, importantly, where they had to complete a 2 minute typing
test. The requirement in the test mirrored their actual task as they were displayed pictures
with book information which they had to type into an online form. The information we
obtain from this test will be important, as we use it to control for heterogeneous ability
across agents.
A research assistant (RA) invited the applicants to come to our library for a specific date
and time. Every day we had subjects come in in two shifts, the morning shift starting
at 8:30am, the afternoon shift starting at 1:30pm. The actual average working time was
3.5hrs. Each shift consisted of a group of four individuals. When inviting individuals to
a certain shift, we used a first-come-first-serve rule and were careful not to sort along any
observable dimension that might interact with our treatment variation. So allocation of
subjects to shifts is mainly driven by subjects availability for a certain time subject to the
constraint that we avoided putting subjects with the same last name, the same address or
the same subject of study into the same shift to avoid any effects from prior relationships.
We instructed our RAs to look for signs of prior relationship (eg. joint arrival, etc.), but
did not find any evidence of that.
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The subjects were welcomed and instructed together by an RA. After their task was
carefully explained to them, the RA showed them the books they had to enter and they
were led by the RA to four adjacent but separate offices that were equipped with laptop
computers with an opened Excel-based entry mask. All entries subjects made in the Excel
mask were saved on a central log file so we can track their performance over time. In
principle, it was possible for the subjects to talk and interact, but we observed no signs
of more than casual interaction. Also, to minimize interaction, our RA brought the books
to the offices of the four subjects and gives them feedback on their performance every 30
minutes. See Figures 4, 5, and 6 in Appendix A for pictures of the physical set up.
Subjects (grouped per shift) were allocated into one of three treatments.
Group: All subjects can leave once 680 books have been registered.5 The feedback
every 30 minutes is given with respect to group progress (“In the last 30 minutes
the group entered x books. So in total the group has entered y out of a total of 680
books.”). (private return from effort < social return)
Single: Each subject can leave individually once 170 books have been registered.
The feedback every 30 minutes is given with respect to individual progress (“In the
last 30 minutes you entered x books. So in total you have entered y out of a total of
170 books.”). (private return from effort = social return)
No Incentives: All workers must work 3.5 hours, irrespective of the number of
books entered. The feedback every 30 minutes is given with respect to individual
progress (“In the last 30 minutes you entered x books. So in total you have entered
y books.”). (private return from effort = 0)
In Group, free riding of group members is an issue as the social benefit from effort is
larger than the private benefit. In contrast, in Single and No Incentives free riding is
no problem as there is no difference between private and social benefits from effort. We
discuss this in more detail in Subsection 2.4. Note that we kept the 30 minute feedback
structure constant across all treatments to get at the true treatment variation and not
confound it with perceived variations in monitoring.
Only at the end of the experiment one of us entered the scene, introducing us (truth-
fully) as academic staff responsible for the library organization, to administer the final
wage payments to the participants. After the payments were made we told them about the
5In the first sessions we had one session with 120 books and 2 sessions with 150 books per person.
People were substantially faster than we expected so we increased the number of books to 170 per person.
We control for this in the analysis.
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opportunity to participate in paid laboratory experiments at MELESSA (Munich Experi-
mental Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences) and invited them to an experimental
session roughly two weeks after the field experiment.6 Subjects could either directly sign
up for a session or we gave them information how to sign up for those sessions at a later
point.
2.3 Laboratory Study
About 2 weeks after the field experiment, we run 5 sessions at MELESSA in Munich
between October 28 and October 30, 2008. Roughly half of our subjects from the field
(49 subjects) come to the lab and we fill up the sessions with people from the MELESSA
subject pool. In total we have 84 subjects (4*16 and 1*20) in the lab where each session
lasts roughly 90 minutes and the average earnings are 23.85e.
We run six rounds of experiments. Rounds 1-3 are non fully anonymous, and rounds 4-6
are fully anonymous. In the non fully anonymous rounds, the groups were randomized for
each of the rounds. Before the round started, subjects were led out of the room and then
each group was led separately to their respective computers. So subjects knew who was in
their group, but did not know who does what within the group in the experiment. This
treatment was meant to resemble the field situation where workers were welcomed and
introduced together. In the fully anonymous treatments, groups are randomly reshuffled
in each round an subjects can neither see the members of their group nor who does what
within the group.
In round 1 and 4 we ran two standard public good games.7 In this typical public good
experiment subjects play in groups of four, get an initial endowment of 20 tokens and must
decide how many tokens they put into a common pool. Tokens in the pool are multiplied
by 1.6 and distributed among the group members. Tokens outside the pool belong to the
subject. This game is repeated ten times with the same groups (partner treatment).
At the end of the experiment, people answered a questionnaire on demographic informa-
tion with standard question from the world value survey (WVS) and the German Socio
Economic Panel (G-SOEP).
6We deliberately chose to become visible only at that stage, to avoid that subjects made the link between
the laboratory study and the prior employment.
7In rounds 2, 3, 5, and 6 we ran an inverse Public Good Game. This new experimental design is
described in Appendix B. We will not discuss these experiments in detail, but suitably adjusted, the
results using those experiments remain unchanged.
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2.4 Comparison between Lab and Field
Lab: In each period each of the 4 subjects in a group receives an endowment of 20 tokens.
A subject i can either keep these tokens for him- or herself or invest gi tokens (0 ≤ gi ≤ 20)
into a project. These decisions are made simultaneously. The monetary payoff for each
subject i in the group is given by pii = 20 − gi + 0.4
∑n
j=1 gj in each period, where 0.4 is
the marginal per capita return from a contribution to the public good. The total payoff is
the sum of the period-payoffs over all ten periods.
Note that the definition of pii implies that full free-riding ( gi = 0) is an individually
rational dominant strategy in the stage game as ∂pii
∂gi
= −1 + 0.4 = −0.6 < 0. However, the
socially efficient choice, maximizing aggregate payoff
∑n
i=1 gi, is given by gi = 20, i.e. fully
cooperating. Hence a social dilemma situation arises.
Field: Though the game theoretic structure is similar, we have no clearcut theoretical
prediction of behavior in the field. It is clear that in the No Incentives treatment
effort should be lowest as there is no link between performance and any payoff relevant
outcome variable (remuneration, leaving time). In the Single treatment subjects are
residual claimants to their effort whereas in the Group treatment only a share of the
marginal return to effort accrues to the subject. As compared to the social optimum we
should expect inefficiently low contributions in Group.
3 Results
3.1 Overview of Lab and Field Results
Before we go into the joint analysis of lab and field results, we present a short summary of
the basic results of the lab and field experiments. In Figure 1 and Figure 2, we present the
results of the public good game in the lab.
Results from our lab public good games are representative of general public good
results.8 Even initially the contribution is not at 20 and the contribution level goes down
over periods. In addition, there is substantial heterogeneity in contribution across subjects.
This is true for the non-anonymous (PG1) and the fully anonymous (PG2) public good
game. Figure 1 shows the average contribution levels over the ten rounds for PG1 on the
left and PG2 on the right. After the experiment started again in PG2, subjects initially
contribute more (restart effect), but then they reduce their contributions again. This restart
8Treatment assignment in the field does neither affect the probability to participate in the lab study
nor the average public good contributions in the lab. Neither does participation in the field experiment
affect lab contributions.
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effect looks relatively small, but it is confounded by a treatment variation between the first
and the second round: In the first round subjects knew with which other subjects they were
in one group; in the second round, they did not. As we know from Fehr and Gaechter (1999)
subjects contribute more if they meet the other people in their group before the experiment.
This may explain why subjects contributed less in the second round, a behavior that looks
like a smaller restart effect. In Figure 2 we present the average contributions combining
PG1 and PG2. We will use this as our main measure of lab contributions. As discussed
below, our results are robust to using varying measures.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the field experiment. We see that there are
more subjects in Group as compared to the other treatments. The odd number of subjects
in No Incentives is driven by a session comprising only 3 subjects due to one worker
not showing up. The slight deviation from 170 in the average number of books entered
in Group comes from some the three first sessions with 120 and 150 books respectively.
The slight deviations from 170 in Single come from one subject who was so slow that he
had not finished his share of books after 5hrs (the advertised maximum working time) and
we allowed him to leave. It is noteworthy that the highest number of books were actually
entered in No Incentives where also the variance in performance was highest. Women
are over-represented in our sample in all treatments. But their share corresponds to the
regular response rate for such jobs at the University of Munich.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Field
Total Group Single No Incentives
Number of Subjects 103 44 32 27
Number of Females 73 32 20 21
Avg. Speed (books/minute) 0.901 0.904 0.913 0.882
Std.Dev. Speed 0.199 0.182 0.217 0.211
Avg. # of Books entered 171.05 165.18 169,00 183,04
Std.Dev. Books entered 32.89 34,85 7,29 44,28
In Figure 3, we plot our measure of adjusted speed over time. We calculate adjusted
speed as a measure of productivity by dividing speed (books per minute) by the testscore
(characters per two minutes).9 We plot the typing speed for the first two hours because
9We can also employ a more sophisticated approach to correct our speed measures for the varying ability
levels of agents by regressing performance on testscore and using the residuals for our analysis. All our
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even the fastest participants worked for at least two hours. In later hours, the fastest
participants in the Single treatment were already finished so that we cannot compare
average speeds. We calculate average speeds for four intervals of half an hour each because
every half an hour the participants received feedback on their progress and the group’s
progress.
We find that adjusted speed changes little over time. In all three treatments subjects
seem to learn a little initially so that they work faster in the second and third half an
hour period. In the Single and No Incentives treatment, the subjects continue to work
as fast or even faster in the last period, while we find a slight drop off in the last period
in the Group treatment. Overall, however, we find little dynamic over time apart from
learning. Therefore, for the rest of this paper, we abstract from dynamic effects and present
all results in terms of average (adjusted) speed over the whole working time of a subject.
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Figure 3: Adjusted Speed First Two Hours in the Field (books per minute/Testscore)
From a casual inspection of Figure 3 seems to suggest that there is little difference be-
tween the treatments in the field experiment. While this is true for the averages, we will
demonstrate in the remainder of the paper that different countervailing effects lie behind
the averages.
results remain robust when we use this alternative measure.
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Table 2: Average Lab Contribution - Skill adjusted Speed
(
Books/Minute
Testscore
)
Full Sample Group No Group
Kendall 0.1559 0.3789 0.0230
(0.1119) (0.0212)∗ (0.8724)
Spearman 0.2254 0.5654 0.0229
(0.1156) (0.0094)∗∗ (0.9043)
N. obs. 50 20 30
In parenthesis, Prob > |t| and Prob > |z| respectively
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%;
3.2 Correlation Lab and Field
In this section, we demonstrate qualitatively that subjects’ behavior in the Group treat-
ment, which allows free riding, in the field is correlated with their lab behavior. While
the subject’s behavior in the other two treatments, which do not allow free riding, is not
correlated with their lab behavior.
A basic prediction of game theoretic models with stable (fairness) preferences is that
subjects with a preference for fairness contribute more in a public good game in the lab
than subjects who have purely egoistic preferences. The same prediction holds for the
Group treatment, in which subjects can free ride, i.e. work slowly, so that the other
group members have to enter into the computer system more of the books assigned to
the whole group. No such prediction holds for the other two treatments (Single and No
Incentives), as in both cases the work load of the other group members is independent
of how fast another member works.
As the theoretic prediction for the lab field correlation is the same for the Single and the
No Incentive treatment, we initially pool the results from the two treatments into the
category No Group. Because we obtain a larger sample size for the No Group treatment
compared to the two single treatments, this makes it more difficult for us to reject the null
hypothesis that there is no correlation in the No Group treatments.10
In Table 2, we present the Kendall and Spearman correlation coefficients between the
average contribution over all twenty periods in the two rounds in the lab experiment and
10In Table 3, we present the results for a three way split, i.e., we separately list the Single and the No
Incentives treatment and we confirm that for neither of the two treatments the correlation is even close
to being significant.
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Table 3: Average Lab Contribution – Skill adjusted Speed
(
Books/Minute
Testscore
)
Group Single No Incentives
Kendall 0.3789 0.3250 −0.0769
(0.0212)∗ (0.0868) (0.7418)
Spearman 0.5654 0.4356 −0.1189
(0.0094)∗∗ (0.0917) (0.6855)
N. obs. 20 16 14
In parenthesis, Prob > |t| and Prob > |z| respectively
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%;
the average adjusted speed in the field. For the full sample (column (1)) we find a slight
correlation that is, however, not significant. When we split the treatments in Group and
No Group, we find that there is almost no correlation in the No Group treatment. In
the Group treatment however, we find a very strong correlation at least at the 5% level
for both tests.
3.3 Regression Analysis of Lab and Field Relationship
In this section, we impose more structure and run a regression analysis to quantify the
impact of the differences in fairness preferences as measured by the lab contributions;
we find the impact is large. We estimate the two specifications with OLS, where each
observation, indexed by i, is one subject that we have observed in the field and in the lab.
In the main specification, we distinguish Group and No Group treatments and estimate
speedi = β0 + β1IGroup + β2scorei + β3contri + β4contriIGroup + εi,
where speedi is the log of the average speed (in books per minute), IGroup is an indicator
variable that takes on the value 1 if the subject participated in the Group treatment in
the field and 0 otherwise, scorei is the log of the testscore (in characters in two minutes),
and contri is the log of the average contribution to the public good over the two rounds.
Note, that we no longer use our skill adjusted speed measure but control for ability directly
in the regression.
In addition, we use a specification with a three way split:
speedi = β0+β1IGroup +β2ISingle +β3scorei +β4contri +β5contriIGroup +β6contriISingle +εi,
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Table 4: OLS Estimates of the Average Speed in the Field Experiment
Books per Minute (Log)
Two Way Split Three Way Split
Group (Dummy) −0.245 −0.313
(0.152) (0.159)
Single (Dummy) −0.282
(0.133)∗
Testscore (Log) 0.469 0.474
(0.107)∗∗∗ (0.113)∗∗∗
Avg. Contribution (Log) −0.004 −0.031
(0.026) (0.023)
Avg. Contribution (Log) * Group 0.166 0.195
(0.074)∗ (0.074)∗
Avg. Contribution (Log) * Single 0.131
(0.072)
N. obs. 50 50
R2 0.452 0.489
In parenthesis robust standard errors clustered at session level
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%;
where ISingle is an indicator variable that is 1 if the subject participated in the Single
treatment in the field and 0 otherwise.
Qualitatively, we get the same results from the regression (Table 4) as from the correlation
coefficients: Average speed is significantly correlated with lab contributions in the Group
treatment, but neither in the No Group treatments taken together, nor in the Single or
No Incentive treatments separately. In addition, we can demonstrate that our typing
speed test captures a meaningful part of ability as the testscore is highly correlated with
average speed.
We use the coefficient estimates of the main specification to obtain a measure of the
economic significance of the effects: A one standard deviation increase in the log average
contribution (71.7%) increases average speed by 13.9% in the Group treatment. We can
compare this with the effect of the testscore: A one standard deviation increase in the
12
Table 5: Lab Contribution – Skill adjusted Speed
(
Books/Minute
Testscore
)
First Periods Last Periods
Group No Group Group No Group
Kendall 0.3579 0.0230 0.2316 0.0529
(0.0292)∗ (0.8722) (0.1600) (0.6930)
Spearman 0.5435 0.0147 0.3335 0.0536
(0.0132)∗ (0.9385) (0.1508) (0.7783)
N. obs. 20 30 20 30
In parenthesis, Prob > |t| and Prob > |z| respectively
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%;
log testscore (28.0%) increases speed by 13.3%, i.e., if subjects have the possibility to free
ride in the field, selecting them on the basis of their lab contributions yields the same
productivity advantage as selecting them on the basis of ability, i.e., the testscore.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
4.1 Who drives our Effects
We can shed some more light on the motivations of the people who contribute in the lab
and in the field. Results from various lab studies suggest that there is a (small) fraction of
subjects who are genuinely willing to contribute, often called altruists. These subjects will
typically contribute even in the last round. There are also other subjects who contribute as
long as they believe that others contribute. These may be either purely egoistic subjects,
strategic egoists, who contribute in the early rounds for strategic reasons to increase the
contributions of others or genuine conditional cooperators who are willing to cooperate as
long as others cooperate. In general, both of these latter types are observationally very
similar and in equilibrium contribute initially but reduce their contributions towards the
end, leading to the downward-sloping pattern of average contributions.
To analyze which of the two groups drives the correlation between the lab and the field,
we correlate productivity in the field with the contribution levels in the first periods of
the two rounds of the lab game and the last periods of the two rounds. If conditional
cooperators and strategic egoists drive the correlation, we should find the correlation for the
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first round but not for the last round. But if genuine altruists are behind the correlation,
we should observe a significant correlation for both periods. In Table 5 we present the
correlation coefficients for the the first and last periods. In neither specification, we find a
significant correlation in the No Group treatments. In the Group treatment, however,
we find a correlation between first period contributions and adjusted speed in the field but
no significant correlation with the last period contributions. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that strategic egoists and conditional cooperators drive the lab field correlations.
4.2 Regression Analysis Field: Group Heterogeneity
In this section, we return to the question why incentives seem to have so little impact on
the speed in the field experiment. We show that incentivizing workers by allowing them
to leave early if they work faster, has ambiguous effects depending on group heterogeneity
with regards to ability: Incentives may even backfire in heterogeneous groups. We focus
on the interaction of incentives and the heterogeneity of the groups with regard to ability,
measured by our testscore. Because we did not select or group the participants in the field
experiment on the basis of their testscores, some of the groups were very heterogeneous
with regards to ability. This heterogeneity did not translate into differences in payment or
working time in the Group and No Incentive treatments; everybody was paid the same
and everybody came and left together. In the Single treatment, however, considerable
differences in working time occurred: In some groups the fastest worker left after two hours,
while his or her slower coworkers had to work for up to five hours. Even if the subjects
could not directly see each other working, they would notice if one of their coworkers left.
We conjecture that the presence of high performers lead to a collapse in motivation of
the low performers in Single treatment. As this effect can only happen in the Single
treatment, we suspect that this effect could drive the seeming ineffectiveness of incentives
in our field experiment.
To investigate this hypothesis in a regression analysis, we need a measure of group het-
erogeneity. We cannot use the standard deviation of actual performances for obvious en-
dogeneity problems. Instead, we use the standard deviation of testscores. We include for
each subject the standard deviation of testscores in his or her group together with the
(log)level of the testscore of the individual subject. We interact the standard deviation
of the testscore with the treatment dummy, as we suspect that heterogeneity plays an
especially important role in the Single treatment.
In Table 6 we present the results of this regression. We find that the point estimates of
the coefficient on the standard deviation of testscores is negative in all three treatments:
14
Table 6: OLS Estimates of the Average Speed in the Field Experiment
Books per Minute (Log)
Group (Dummy) 0.381
(0.380)
Single (Dummy) 0.918
(0.400)∗
Testscore (Log) 0.455
(0.084)∗∗∗
Std. Testscore (Log) −0.012
(0.061)
Std. Testscore (Log) * Group −0.075
(0.083)
Std. Testscore (Log) * Single −0.189
(0.089)∗
N. obs. 103
R2 0.360
In parenthesis robust standard errors clustered at session level
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%;
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heterogeneous groups perform worse. But the size of the effect varies over treatments. It is
very small for the No Incentive treatment, somewhat larger for the Group treatment,
and by far largest for the Single treatment. It is statistically significant (at the 5% level)
only in the Single treatment. If we control for group heterogeneity, we get different
estimates of the treatment dummies. These dummies now capture the treatment effect for
a perfectly homogeneous group. We find that the point estimates are now positive for the
Group treatment (which provides some incentives) and even more positive for the Single
treatment (which provides the strongest incentives). Only the coefficient for the Single
treatment is significant (at the 5% level). The point estimates are large, in particular for
the effect of Single treatment relative to the No Incentives treatment. The coefficient
estimates implies a 250% increase in speed if we go from No Incentives to the Single
treatment in a perfectly homogeneous group.
Our experimental set-up was not designed to explicitly answer the reasons behind the
strong effect of heterogeneity. It could be that the slow members of a group feel unfairly
treated because they must work much longer for the same amount of money than the fast
members. Therefore, they may experience a collapse of motivation. Maybe, the Single
treatment introduces a notion of competition that motivates group members that work at
a similar speed, but discourages laggards. Whatever the reason for the interaction effects
of treatment and heterogeneous ability, the effects are large. Whenever we introduce incen-
tives, we reward not only effort but also ability, and we know little how this is perceived by
workers, as most lab experiments abstract from heterogeneous ability. Our results suggest
that this interaction should be added to the growing list of potential pitfalls associated
with the provision of explicit incentives.
4.3 Summary
We run a public good experiment in the field and in the lab with (partly) the same subjects.
The field experiment is a true natural field experiment as subjects do not know that they
are exposed to an experimental variation. Our study offers various contributions. We
can establish that lab behavior is externally valid, as behavior in the lab and in the field
correlates, even within subjects. We can go beyond the existing literature, as we have
treatment and control groups in the field. Using the placebo treatments, we can show
that the correlation is only present in the public good treatment (Group) but not in
the other treatments (Single, No Incentives). I.e., subjects behave similarly under
“similar” incentive structures. We take this as indication for the external validity of public
good experiments. This might also be indicative for the existence of stable preference
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types. Furthermore, the simple game theoretic structure of the public good game seems to
capture important aspects of real life situations. Moreover, we can show that the effect of
“fairness” preferences on performance is economically relevant, in our setting comparable
in size to the effect of ability. Finally we document the (detrimental) effect of heterogeneity
w.r.t. ability on performance under explicit incentive structures.
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A Set-Up: Field Experiment
Figure 4: Workspace
Figure 5: Office location
Figure 6: Books that had to be entered
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B Instructions: Laboratory Experiment
Instructions (translated from German)
Welcome to the experiment and thanks a lot for your participation! From now on, please do not
speak to other participants of this experiment any more!
General remarks on the procedure
This experiment serves to analyze economic decision making. You can earn money by taking part,
which will be paid in cash after the experiment. During the experiment, you and other participants
are asked to make decisions. Both your own decisions as well as those of other participants will
determine your pay-off according to the following rules. The whole experiment lasts about 90
minutes. You will receive detailed instructions at the beginning. If you have questions regarding
the instructions, please raise your hand. One of the conductors of the experiment will then come
to you and answer your question personally. Each participant receives a fixed ID number by which
he or she is identified during the experiment. During the experiment, we do not speak in terms
of Euro, but Experiment-Points (EP). Your earnings will be calculated in EP in the course of the
experiment. At the end of the experiment, all EPs you have earned will be converted into Euro
using the following exchange rate:
1 Experiment-Point = 2 Euro-Cent
At the End: The experiment consists of 6 parts. It ends after the 6th part. The results from
the individual rounds will be added up and converted into Euro. Your earnings will be paid out
after the 6th part.
Anonymity: In each of the 6 parts, you will play in a new group. In each part your group
will be re-matched randomly. Sometimes you know who is in your group, sometimes you do not.
The other participants do not know during nor after the experiment which role you have taken
or how much you have earned. We will evaluate the data from the experiment anonymously and
delete all your personal and person-related information as soon as we have matched the data. At
the end of the experiment you have to sign a receipt of your earnings which serves for accounting
purposes only.
The Experiment
Part 1
Groups: At the beginning of part 1 you will be randomly divided into groups of four. In each
later part your group will be re-matched randomly. You can see the other members of your
group. But you cannot attribute decisions to other group members. Thus all group members stay
anonymous. The 1st part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds in total. The composition of
the group stays the same over the whole 1st part.
Budget and alternatives in each round: Each participant receives 20 Points in the beginning
of each round. You can freely divide the points into two alternatives, X and Y:
1. You can put 0 to 20 points into pot X. The sum of the points in pot X will be multiplied
by 1.6 and distributed equally among the group members. That is, for each point in pot
X you will get 0.4 (=1.6/4) points. For example, if the sum of the points in pot X in your
group is 60, each group member will get 60*0.4=24 points from pot X. If all group members
together contribute 10 points to pot X, you and all other group members will get 10*0.4=4
EP from pot X.
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2. You can put 0 to 20 points into pot Y. This amount goes then one-to-one into your earnings.
So if you, for instance, contribute 6 points to pot Y, you get exactly 6 points. Your earnings
per round is then the sum of your earnings from pot X and that from pot Y.
In mathematical terms, the result is:
Result (for member i) = (20 − xi) + (S ∗ 1.6)/4
xi is the contribution of member i to pot X
S is the sum of the contributions of all group members to pot X
You will be asked on the screen how many points you want to contribute to pot X. The rest of
the 20 points automatically goes to pot Y. Therefore, it is not possible to save points. You can
enter only an integer number between 0 and 20 (i.e. 0; 1; 2; . . . ; 19; 20). After each round you
will get to know the contributions of your group members to pot X and your total earning in this
round in EPs. In the course of part 1 you will make 10 decisions according to the instructions
above. Please remember: You will receive 20 points in each round, which you have to distribute
to pot X and Y.
You will determine your deposit with the slider (See Figure 7). A click on the right-arrow
increases your deposit by 1 point, whereas a click on the left-arrow reduces your deposit by 1
point.
You will get the instructions for the 2nd part of the experiment after end of the 1st part.
Part 2
Groups: At the beginning of part 2 you will be randomly assigned to a new group of four
participants. In each later part your group will be re-matched randomly. You can see the other
members of your group. But you cannot attribute decisions to other group members. Thus all
group members stay anonymous.
Budget and alternatives in each round: In this 2nd part, each group has to deposit a sum
of 240 points into a pot. The game ends as soon as the group has raised these 240 points. In the
beginning, each member receives a budget of 220 points. From these points you must deposit at
least 10 per round into the group pot. You can increase your contribution in steps of 2.5 points
up to 60 points. If the necessary 240 points have not been deposited after a certain round, the
experiment goes to the next round and you can again choose your contribution. The experiment
continues to move to further rounds until the number of deposited points in the group pot reaches
240. For each round played, expenses of 20 points will be subtracted from every member.
Consider the following case:
In the first and second round the participants have deposited altogether 180 points into the group
pot. This means that at the beginning of the 3rd round there are still 60 points to be raised. In
the third round, two participants contribute 10 points each and the other two pay in 15 points
each. Then, at the beginning of the 4th round, the number of points still to be raised decreases
to 10 points (=60 points - 2*10 points - 2*15 points). In addition, the budget of the participants
who have contributed 15 points decreases by 35 points (15 points contribution and 20 points
expenses per round). The budget of the participants who have contributed 10 points decreases
by 30 (10 points contribution and 20 points expenses per round). If in a round the participants
raise more points than the total necessary amount, the points and the expenses will be subtracted
proportionally from each participant.
Consider the following case:
At the beginning of the third round, the participants have deposited altogether 180 points into
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the group pot. So they still need to raise 60 points. If now in the third round each participant
deposits 30 points, then the total contribution would be 120 instead of the 60 points needed. In
this case, the budget of each participant decreases on a pro-rata basis only by 15 points (=60/120
* 30 contributed points) and the 10 (=60/120 * 20) points of expenses for this round.
In the end you will get as payoff the points that remain from your budget after the last round.
You will be asked on the screen how many points you want to contribute to the group pot. You
can enter a number between 10 and 60 in steps of 2.5 (i.e. 10; 12.5; 15; . . . ; 57.5; 60). After each
round you get to know the sum of the contributions of your group members to the group pot and
your remaining budget in experiment points.
You determine your deposit with the slider (See Figure 8). A click on the right-arrow increases
your deposit by 2.5 point, whereas a click on the left-arrow reduces your deposit by 2.5 point.
You will get the instructions for the 3rd part of the experiment after the end of the 2nd part.
Part 3
Groups: At the beginning of part 3 you will be randomly assigned to a new group of four
participants. In each later part your group will be re-matched randomly. You can see the other
members of your group. But you cannot attribute decisions to other group members. Thus, all
group members stay anonymous.
Budget and alternatives in each round: Same as in part 2.
Part 4
Groups: At the beginning of part 4 you will be randomly assigned to a new group of four
participants. In each later part your group will be re-matched randomly. You will not come to
know the other members of your group, neither during nor after the experiment. So your decisions
stay anonymous. The 4th part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds in total. The composition
of the group stays the same for the whole 4th part.
Budget and alternatives in each round: Same as in part 1.
Part 5
Groups: At the beginning of part 5 you will be randomly assigned to a new group of four
participants. In each later part your group will be re-matched randomly. You will not come to
know the other members of your group, neither during nor after the experiment. So your decisions
stay anonymous.
Budget and alternatives in each round: Same as in part 2.
Part 6
Groups: At the beginning of part 6 you will be randomly assigned to a new group of four
participants. You will not come to know the other members of your group, neither during nor
after the experiment. So your decisions stay anonymous.
Budget and alternatives in each round: Same as in part 2.
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Figure 7: Screenshot: Decision Screen for Part 1 and 4
Figure 8: Screenshot: Decision Screen for Part 2,3,5, and 6
Figure 9: Screenshot: Exit Questionnaire
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